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ABSTRACT 
Complementarity of money mean that two or more kinds of monies together fulfil 
the demand of the users better than they would without the existence of the other(-
s). In this paper we study complementarity between paper monies in Sweden. We 
address four questions: 1) What was used as money on a macro level (money 
supply) and on a micro level (monetary remittances)? 2) What was the relative 
value of different monies in parallel circulation? 3) Was there seasonal variations 
in use and/or value? 4) Was there geographical variations in use and value? What 
we find is that the complementarity helped to solve the problem of providing 
sufficient liquidity domestically over time and space and thus and to keep a stable 
value of the currency. 
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Introduction 
In relation to other European economies, Sweden experienced both an early and a widespread 
circulation of officially sanctioned paper monies of various origins. In 1661, the short-lived 
Stockholm Banco started to issue copper notes which initially came to circulate above par 
value. A few years later, the Parliament opened its own bank, Rikets Ständers Bank literally 
meaning the Parliament’s Bank, now known as the Riksbank. It started to issue something 
similar to certified checks in 1701 which circulated as paper money side by side with specie 
money. In 1745 most specie was drawn out of circulation and Sweden went on a paper 
standard. This time the Riksbank started to issue notes with printed denominations. Since then 
the Swedish money supply has mainly consisted of paper money. 
In 1789, the National Debt Office (Riksgäldskontoret) started to issue large quantities of 
small denomination interest bearing promissory notes which circulated simultaneously with 
the Riksbank notes for forty years. In 1831, Enskilda (private) banks started to issue notes 
which circulated side by side with the Riksbank notes for another seventy years. Besides these 
more officially sanctioned notes, the Swedish money supply also consisted of a mixture of 
notes issued by a variety of organisations and individuals. It is clear that during most of the 
period from 1789 to 1903, multiple paper monies circulated in Sweden. 
Cases like the Swedish have not attracted much research with theoretical ambitions. Most 
monetary theorists assume the normality of homogenous monetary systems and the neutrality 
of money. There seems to be much in favour of one type of (national) money. In a multiple 
currency system, the main difficulty has been to achieve and maintain stable value relations 
between different monies in use.
1 Both instability as such and the attempts to stabilise relative 
values have increased monetary transaction costs.
2  
The Swedish monetary authorities attempted to handle the situation with unstable monetary 
value and supply in the same way as other monetary authorities in Europe at the time. The 
belief that specie was the only form of ‘real’ money remained unchallenged. With a limited 
amount of specie available, paper money was issued only to represent ‘real’ money at a fixed 
rate. Coins were what contemporary commentators at least until the end of the nineteenth 
                                                 
1 Cf. for instance the recent contribution by T. J. Sargent and F. R. Velde, The Big Problem of Small (Princeton, 
2002). 
2 The reduction of monetary transaction costs in the process of homogenising national currencies is discussed by 
E. Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca and 
London, 2003).   3
century tended to see as ‘real’ money.
3 Nevertheless, the monetary authorities repeatedly 
failed maintain this fixed rate and it had therefore repeatedly to re-establish the relationship 
between paper money and specie. Despites attempts to create a homogenous national money 
supply, multiple monies continued to exist in Sweden throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century. 
Apparently, systems with multiple monies are so persistent that they must have been of 
importance to contemporary actors. They are also prevalent in history. The Swedish case is 
only one of many historical situations in which monies of various descriptions and origins 
have circulated side by side. Still, in those cases when multiple monies are scholarly 
discussed, they are often perceived as anomalies which eventually were to disappear by an 
evolutionary process. Most of this research perceives different monies as competing 
substitutes. It is argued that a system with perfect competing monies would be efficient. 
However, since most historical cases of multiple monies are far from fulfilling the conditions 
of a free market, we are obliged to continue to look for some other logic behind the 
persistence and prevalence of multiple monies. Limited research is made to understand the 
reasons for or impact of the co-existence of different monies. Differences between monies are 
neglected and lost when all monies in circulation are reduced to substitutes for what is 
regarded as ‘real’ money. 
Our aim is to discuss whether these cases of multiple monies are not better understood as 
cases of complementarity. Complementary monies would basically mean that an increase in 
the demand for one kind of money increases the demand for the other and that they together 
fulfil the demand of the users better than they would without the existence of the other. In 
short, by using the concept of complementarity we try to understand why there were multiple 
monies in circulation instead of only one kind of money. 
In contrast to the other studies on complementary monies, we are concerned with 
complementarity between paper monies. Paper monies are of course in some respects 
different from specie money since paper monies have no intrinsic value and therefore often 
are seen as only representing ‘real’ money. However, in most cases in history specie coins 
were valued far above the metal value which indicates that the value of money, at least to 
                                                 
3 When the Riksbank notes in the smallest denomination, i.e. 1 SEK, was abolished in 1879 the official reason 
was that the existence of this kind of notes made the public confuse notes with coins, see A. Ögren, Empirical 
Studies in Money, Credit and Banking: The Swedish Credit Market in Transition under the Silver and the Gold 
Standards, 1834–1913 (Stockholm, 2003); A. Ögren, ‘Free or central banking? Liquidity and financial 
deepening in Sweden, 1834–1913’ Explorations in Economic History, 43 (2006).    4
some extent, is determined by the demand for money or for its functions. In that case, the 
evaluation of paper money is made in the same way as of specie money. 
We study two episodes with multiple paper monies in circulation in Sweden. During the 
first period, between 1789 and 1830, the National Debt Office issued notes in addition to the 
Riksbank notes. In this first case, there was a shift in the relative proportions of notes with a 
diminishing circulation of notes of higher quality and discounts in the value of them. During 
the second period, between 1831 and 1903, private note issuing banks complemented the 
Riksbank in providing liquidity. In this other case, multiple monies circulated side by side at 
stable relative values indicating that they served to adjust to the demands for liquidity without 
leading to changing internal value still without being substitutes.  
In our empirical analysis, we address four questions: 1) We analyse what was used as 
money both on an aggregated level by looking at the money supply in absolute and relative 
terms and on a micro level by looking at the content of monetary remittances. 2) We study the 
relative value of different monies in parallel circulation. Our aim is to understand why some 
cases of multiple monies where successful in maintaining a fixed relative value whereas 
others where not. 3) We believe that the value of money is determined by the demand for 
money and since demand fluctuates in relation to economic activities, we try to establish 
seasonal variations in both use and value. 4) Kuroda has in his previous research identified 
complementarity between monies floating in different monetary circuits. We will therefore try 
to see whether money of different origin circulated in different ways. 
We find that in the Swedish case one kind of money could not fulfil the basic monetary 
function of providing sufficient liquidity and at the same time keep a relatively stable 
monetary value in relation to foreign currencies. In the Swedish experience ‘real’ money was 
not only scarce; it was also unevenly dispersed between different parts of the country and 
unevenly demanded over the seasons in line with the needs of the agricultural economy. A 
system of complementary served to solve the dilemma of sufficient liquidity domestically and 
a stable currency value both internally and externally.  
Data on Macro and on Micro Level 
A reason for the lack of theoretical interest in multiple monies might be that historical sources 
seldom disclose exactly what kind of means of payment that were used in practice. Account 
books and letters between traders state the value of the payments expressed in a certain unit of   5
account while in a situation with multiple monies, we do not know what monies were used to 
remit that stated value. 
In the case of Sweden, there is a source which makes it possible to go beyond the unit of 
account and to do a rather unique study of what money people actually used when making 
payments, namely open registered-letter post receipts. These receipts are the result of the 
widespread practice of using the postal service for making long distant payments and the fact 
that between 1794 and 1872 it was by ordinance prescribed that the remitter should make a 
list specifying the content of the money sent by open registered-letter post.
4  
From 1794, the general procedure for sending money by post was as follows: The sender 
brought an unsealed envelope to the local post master, a list specifying the notes to be 
included and the money. The post master counted the money and acknowledged the list 
provided by the sender by signing it. The letter was then sealed either by the sender or the 
post master. Finally, the sender got a receipt, stating the name and place of the addressee, the 
total amount enclosed and from 1850 the fees paid, which was attached to the note list. 
In this paper we make use of the collection of open registered-letter receipts held by the 
Postmuseum (Postal Museum) in Stockholm.
5 The collection has not previously been used 
systematically although it is the larges known collection. It contains more than one thousand 
documents of which 580 are receipts from remittance between individuals or individual firm 
representatives from the period before 1872 (table 1). In slightly more than two third these 
cases, the list specifying the notes the letter contained also remains. In total, almost 30 000 
notes have been identified with a value of 780 000 Riksdaler Riksmynt. The median payment 
for letters with the content listed is 646 Riksdaler Riksmynt while the median for those 
without a list is 300 Riksdalar Riksmynt. The average is 1966 Riksdaler Riksmynt and 613 
Riksdaler Riksmynt respectively. Unfortunately, only 19 receipts remain from 1789 to 1830 of 
which 9 have the containing notes listed. This collection can therefore be used for an 




                                                 
4 N. Forssell, Svenska Postverkets Historia, Band II, (Stockholm 1936), pp. 238–45. 
5 Postmusem, Archives, Stockholm [henceforth Postmuseum]: Öppen assurans, II.260.b [henceforth II.260.b].   6
Table 1. Overview of the collection of open registered-letter receipts at Postmuseum 
Amount  Number of open registered-letters receipts
Riksdaler Riksmynt  with note list  without note list  Total 
< 300  88  82  170 
300–699 117  49  166 
700–2999 114  41  155 
> 2999  83  6  89 
 402  178  580 
Source: Postmuseum, Archives, Stockholm: Öppen assurans, II.260.b., 1789–1872. 
The macro data is in general taken from the statistical part of the history of the Riksbank.
6 
Regarding the money supply and in particular the note issuance of the Enskilda banks in the 
nineteenth century, data recently revised by Ögren has been used.
7 
Riksbank and National Debt Office Notes, 1789 – 1830 
The National Debt Office originated from the Parliament’s Office (Riksens Ständers Kontor) 
founded in 1719. This authority had had the task of managing and repaying the substantial 
debts accrued from the wars run by the former king Karl XII. When the National Debt Office 
was formed in 1789, the debt of the Swedish State to foreign lenders was substantial.
8 At this 
time, notes issued by the Riksbank were redeemable into a fixed amount of specie. But, this 
had only been the case since the adoption of the silver standard in 1776. The experience of 
this adoption was that the deflationary effects had been severely costly for the Swedish 
economy. 
In 1788 the strong regent of Sweden king Gustav III, requested funds to finance the war on 
Russia from the bank of the parliament; the Riksbank. But the board of the Riksbank denied 
this and argued that the newly established silver standard was to be protected. The king 
questioned this refusal of the Riksbank and took a loan against the will of the parliament.
9 
This measure further consolidated the government’s independence of the parliamentary 
control. 
                                                 
6 ‘Statistiska tabeller 1668–1924’, in Sveriges Riksbank 1668–1918–1924. Bankens tillkomst och verksamhet. 
Del V: Bilagor (Stockholm, 1931). 
7 Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking, Appendix – Numerical Data. 
8 G. Ahlström, Studier i svensk ekonomisk politik och prisutveckling 1776–1802 (Lund, 1974), pp. 93–4; B. 
Carlsson, ‘Riksgäldsfullmäktige 1789-1989’, in E. Dahmén (ed.) Upplåning och utveckling. Riksgäldskontoret 
1789–1989 (Stockholm, 1989), p. 35 
9 E. F. Heckscher, ‘Riksgälds en unik fas i det svenska penningväsendets historia’ Ekonomisk tidskrift 51 (1949), 
pp. 235, 246.    7
What kind of money was used? 
As a compromise with the parliament the National Debt Office was given the task of raising 
further capital. Unlike the Riksbank, the board of this Office was influenced by the 
government, as the king’s representative was appointed chairman. The National Debt Office 
was given the right to issue interest bearing promissory notes. According to the parliamentary 
regulation, the Office could issue notes to an amount of maximum 600 000 Riksdaler Specie 
which might be compared to the Riksbank which circulated approximately 5.5 million 
Riksdaler Specie in 1789. The National Debt Office had exceeded this ‘maximum’ amount 
within one month.
10 
As seen in figure 1 below, the massive issuance of notes conducted by the National Debt 
relative to the Riksbank, made the main part of the money supply consist of National Debt 
Office notes. Riksbank notes were officially legal tender. National Debt Office notes were in 
practice legal tender being accepted for all payments, including taxes, with the notable 
exception of not being possible to use for payments and deposits in the Riksbank. The 
Riksbank consistently refused to accept any connection to the notes issued by the Office, 
referring to its responsibility for the fixed exchange rate. No such responsibility limited the 
issuing capacities of the National Debt Office.
11  
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Source: Ahlström, Politik och prisutveckling, p. 24, ‘Statistiska tabeller 1668–1924’ 
Throughout the period, the Riksbank maintained the specie standard. The first credit notes 
issued by the National Debt Office were interest bearing. Since the Office issued notes to such 
                                                 
10 Heckscher, ‘Riksgälds’, pp. 236, 245; ‘Statistiska tabeller 1668–1924’, p. 44.   8
an amount and these were accepted as means of payments by the public, the interest rate 
bearing feature of these notes was dropped in 1791. Until the settlement between the 
Riksbank and the National Debt Office in 1803, the notes issued by the two monetary 
authorities were indirectly valued at par since they were both denominated in Riksdaler. 
In 1791 the promissory notes issued by the National Debt Office were no longer interest 
bearing. And to pay off earlier loans the Office maintained its note issuance, which continued 
until an agreement was settled with the Riksbank in 1803. It was then decided that the 
Riksbank should take over the responsibility for the notes in circulation that had been issued 
by the National Debt Office. In 1803 National Debt Office notes at a nominal value of no less 
than 19 million Riksdaler Specie was in circulation.
12   
Despite the limited number of note-lists remaining (table 2), it is possible to make some 
reflections based on the postal remittances. In 1790, the unit of account is only Riksdaler. The 
previous reference to ‘Specie’ had disappeared. The first receipt with a proper note list is from 
August 1791. The letter remits fifty Riksdaler in three National Debt Office notes, one thirty 
Riksdaler note, one fifteen Riksdaler and one five Riksdaler.
13 In the other two remaining 
letters from the early 1790s, sent from the same household to the same receiver, includes also 
only National Debt Office notes. Whatever notes that previously had been used; they were 
replaced by the National Debt Office notes in the early 1790s. 
Table 2. Prevalence of types of money in open registered-letter post 1789-1830 
Kind of money  No of letters in 
which they appear
First appearance Last appearance 
Nation Debt Office  5  1791  1828 
Riksbank 3  1824  1830 
Banco Transport 
(certified checks) 
3 1824  1824 
Source: Postmuseum: II.260.b.; 1789-1830. 
While these receipts confirm the dominance of National Debt Office notes in circulation, it 
might question one advocated explanation for the popularity of the National Debt Office’s 
notes among the public, namely that the small denominations of the National Debt Office 
                                                                                                                                                         
11 See Heckscher, ‘Riksgälds’. 
12 G. Hallendorf, ‘Bankens öden från mössväldet till den andra realisationen, 1766–1803’, in Sveriges Riksbank 
1668–1918–1924. Bankens tillkomst och verksamhet. Del III. (Stockholm, 1931), pp. 209, 221–35, 290; 
Heckscher, ‘Riksgälds’, p. 254 
13 Postmusem: II.260.b; Eksjö (1791), Ståhlhammar to von Krebs, Linköping.   9
notes were preferred to the larger Riksbank notes.
14 For postal remittances, large 
denominations were preferred since that reduced the postage and in these few cases the notes 
were not particularly small.  
Relative value 
Whatever the reason was for the practical diminishing of Riksbank notes in circulation, this 
development resulted in several important changes in the monetary situation in Sweden. 
Quickly a market where these notes could be exchanged was established. This market grew in 
importance and made its mark also on capital markets outside of Sweden. It is clear that the 
market did not value the Riksbank and National Debt Office notes at par (figure 2). On the 
contrary, there was almost immediately a divergence in value in the market between Riksbank 
and National Debt Office notes. It seems as Riksbank notes obeyed the monetary adverse 
selection mechanism labeled Gresham’s law, although this law originally concerns only 
metallic coins. As the relative value changed in favor of the Riksbank notes, the public would 
hold on to these notes and not circulate them. 
Figure 2. Ratio between the Riksdaler Banco and the Riksdaler Riksgälds on different 















Source: S. Mårtenson, Agiot under kreditsedelsepoken 1789–1802 (Göteborg, 1958), ‘Statistiska tabeller 1668–
1924’. 
As the value diverged, two ‘new’ currencies were invented. The former Riksdaler Specie 
was divided into Riksdaler Banco issued by the Riksbank and the Riksdaler Riksgälds issued 
                                                 
14 See K. Fregert and L. Jonung, ‘Inflation and switches between specie and paper standard in Sweden 1668 –  10
by the National Debt Office. Both these two currencies were in practice issued by the state 
and circulated simultaneously. As the latter circulated to a higher extent, prices quickly 
became quoted in the currency of the National Debt Office.
15 Consequently, the new currency 
Riksdaler Riksgälds within short became the unit of account as a response to the higher supply 
of this currency and the changing relative value of the two currencies in the market. 
Other observations: seasonality and geographical circuits 
At present, we do not know much more about the seasonal aspects than that the issuance of 
the National Debt Office notes was made in lumps and that the premium on Riksbank notes 
was not stable throughout the year.
16 This latter fluctuation might be explained by drastic 
shifts in the supply of National Debt Office notes or by fluctuating demand for notes 
narrowing the gap between the two. 
When it comes to the circuits of Riksbank and National Debt Office notes, we know even 
less. The National Debt Office issued its notes in Stockholm and they were then dispersed 
throughout the country. The National Debt Office did not redeem its notes, but they were 
accepted for tax payment which was done at county level. This might give an explanation for 
the variation in the premium on Riksbank notes. In the spring, when taxes were to be paid, 
there might not have been any reason to accept a below par value for the National Debt Office 
notes. 
This episode serves to give some insights in how a system of parallel currencies may work 
through a market mechanism. But it also shows how institutions based on a rigid idea of what 
constitutes money may work in contradiction with such a system. The situation with two 
independent national currencies was not accepted and as a consequence a restored monetary 
unity was on top of the political agenda at least from 1796. However, voices from groups 
whose income was not dependent on taxes or rents promoted the idea of maintaining the paper 
standard. In 1800 a detailed plan was agreed upon in the parliament. But external forces 
delayed the Riksbank’s possibility to take over the liabilities of the National Debt Office, and 
thus these grew from 15 million to 19 million Riksdaler Banco.
17 When the Riksbank took 
over responsibility for the National Debt Office notes in circulation in 1803, the exchange rate 
                                                                                                                                                         
1931: A public finance interpretation’, Scottish Journal of political economy, 43 (1996). 
15 See Heckscher, ‘Riksgälds’; Fregert and Jonung, ‘Inflation and switches’, p. 458. 
16 See A. Ögren, ‘Monetary Theory and Practice: Parallel currencies in Sweden, 1789–1833’ unpublished paper 
presented at the H2S EconomiX seminar at École normale supérieure (ENS) – Cachan, (22 March 2007); 
‘Statistiska tabeller 1668–1924’. 
17 Hallendorf, ‘Bankens öden’; Heckscher, ‘Riksgälds’, p. 254   11
was fixed at 1:1.5 in favor of the Riksbank. The division between these two currencies was 
visible until the monetary reform of 1855. Notes issued by the Riksbank, as well as the private 
banks were denominated in both currencies, but the denomination was regularly ‘even’ in 
Riksdaler Riksgälds.
18 
What the experience showed is that, while on the silver standard, Riksbank notes alone 
were insufficient to meet the economy’s demand for domestic liquidity. The National Debt 
Office notes became a complement to the Riksbank notes. An exchange rate market quickly 
emerged to deal with the fact that the National Debt Office were issued at par value with the 
Riksbank notes without any binding connection to those. Consequently, the two currencies 
circulated side by side while their relative value fluctuated.  
But the rigidity of the two authorities led to a competitive situation that turned the 
complementarity of the paper monies in to a process of substitution. The Riksbank was rigid 
in the way it preserved the specie standard and its denial to have anything with the National 
Debt Office notes to do. The National Debt Office was rigid in its refusal to accept the 
Riksbank notes as of higher quality and disregarding the effects of its massive note issuance. 
Due to these rigid views, monetary order could only be restored by the abolishment the 
independence of the National Debt Office notes. 
Riksbank and Enskilda Bank Notes, 1831 – 1903 
In 1824 the Parliament decided that it should be possible to establish banks. These banks 
should as all business run under the principle of solidarity and in order to fund the business 
the banks should have the right to issue credit notes. After the principle decision to readopt 
the silver standard had been taken in 1830 the first bank applied for a charter in 1831. Due to 
institutional constraints on banking establishment the number of banks first grew very slowly. 
In 1846 the first law that standardised the Enskilda banks charters came.
19 The number of 
Enskilda banks continued to increase slowly to eight in 1848 and to twelve in 1856. 
What kind of money was used? 
The content of these letters clearly shows that there existed paper money of different origin 
circulating at the same time in Sweden. There are in some cases notes issued by private firms 
and private individuals, domestic bills of exchange, coins, stamps, and Danish and Norwegian 
                                                 
18 See Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking, Chapter 1. See also table 5 below. 
19 Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking, Chapter 2; Ögren, ‘Free or central banking?’.   12
notes (before the formation of the Scandinavian currency union). However, in the letters we 
predominantly find official Riksbank notes and notes issued by private Enskilda banks. This 
is fully in accordance with expectations. 
Table 3. Prevalence of types of money in open registered-letter post 1831-1872 







Riksbank 240  1837  1872 
Enskilda banks  337  1844  1872 
IOUs to be drawn on the Riksbank 
by firms or banks 
42 1844  1872 
IOUs to be drawn on private 
individuals 
6 1848  1863 
Specie coins  9  1854  1864 
Stamps 48  1856  1871 
Bills of Exchange  4  1859  1871 
Foreign notes  3  1864  1868 
Source: Postmuseum: II.260.b.; 1831-1872. 
The Riksbank notes and Enskilda bank notes were definitely not perfect substitutes. 
Riksbank notes could, in contrast to Enskilda bank notes, be transferred abroad and used for 
tax payments. However, the Enskilda banks started to pay tax collectors for exchanging the 
Enskilda bank notes into legal tender when tax payments were done.
20 Furthermore, 
throughout the period the Riksbank had the right to issue notes in smaller denominations than 
the Enskilda banks. But the amount of notes in the smallest denomination available for the 
Enskilda banks was quite substantial. In 1834, about 55 per cent of the Riksbank notes in 
circulation were in small denominations.
21 From then on, the share of large notes increased, 
the share of middle range notes remained low and that of small notes stagnated.  
Throughout the period the Enskilda banks would operate with reserves consisting of 
Riksbank notes, thus withdrawing Riksbank notes from circulation. Since the Enskilda bank 
notes came to replace other forms of money that are more difficult to find data on we can not 
know exactly to what extent the Enskilda bank notes served to increase liquidity. We have 
defined liquidity as the amount of Riksbank notes not being held as reserves in the banking 
system plus the amount of Enskilda bank notes. The increase in liquidity by the Enskilda 
                                                 
20 Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking, Chapter 2; Ögren, ‘Free or central banking?’. 
21 That is up to 4 ½ riksdaler riksgäld. T. Lindgren, Riksbankens sedelhistoria 1668–1968 (Stockholm, 1968), p. 
199.   13
banks has been calculated as Enskilda bank notes in circulation minus Riksbank notes held as 
banking reserves. 



















































































Nominal increase in liquidity
Total liquidity held by the public
 
Source: Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking. 
Remark: Liquidity is defined as Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes being held by the public 
The Enskilda banks may have been few in numbers but their notes quickly helped release 
the constraint on liquidity that the silver standard meant. But the Enskilda bank notes did not 
only increase liquidity, they replaced less trustworthy money in circulation such as IOUs, 
promissory notes and/or authorized assignments. They also as a matter of fact decreased the 
number of varieties of money in circulation since the laws more and more came to standardize 
the note issuance as well as the basis of operations of the Enskilda banks. The practice of 
using private IOUs in circulation might have come more or less to an end in the late 1840s 
when the public suffered an economic loss following a trade crisis when several merchants 
known to have issued private notes went bankrupted.  
The composition of the money in circulation was altered radically. Already by the late 
1850s more Enskilda bank notes were circulating than Riksbank notes. At first this was due to 
the Enskilda banks use of Riksbank notes as reserves which kept them from circulating. This 
was particularly true during the early and middle 1870s when most of the notes issued by the 
Riksbank were held by the Enskilda banks.    14


















































































Source: Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking. 
If we compare this aggregated stock of Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes with the 
proportion between Riksbank notes and Enskilda bank notes changed between 1850 and 1875 
in the postal remittances. In table 4, it is shown that the proportion of Riksbank notes used in 
circulation in our sample is below the share of Riksbank notes of total money supply. This 
indicates that there was a tendency to hold Riksbanks notes if possible. On the other hand, 
since a not negligible share of the Riksbank notes were in small denominations and these were 
not used frequently for postal remittances (table 5) the use of Riksbank notes was perhaps 
proportionate after all. 













1848–1852 34063  66%  31%  4%  100% 
1853–1857 95560  28%  65%  7%  100% 
1858–1862 360522  18%  74% 8%  100% 
1863–1867 250641  11%  78%  11%  100% 
1868–1872 40614  10%  72%  18%  100% 
 781501         
Source: Postmuseum: II.260.b.; 1848–1872.   15
Table 5. Frequency in the use of notes of different denominations (per cent of notes), 1831–
1858. 






0:32 1.00  1%  4%  0% 
2:00 3.00  2%  12%  0% 
3:16 5.00  14%  1%  16% 
5:00 7.50  5%  0%  6% 
6:32 10.00  29%  11%  34% 
10:00 15.00  7%  28%  3% 
16:32 25.00  1%  8%  0% 
33:16 50.00  31%  12%  35% 
50:00 75.00  2%  0%  2% 
66:32 100.00  2%  0%  3% 
100:00 150.00  3%  16%  0% 
500:00 750.00  1%  6%  0% 
Misc. Misc.  2%  2%  1% 
   100%  100%  100% 
Source: Postmuseum: II.260.b.; 1831–1858. 
Annual bank data indicates that Riksbank notes were actually drawn out of circulation. But 
we know that this to a large extent was to fill reserves of the Enskilda banks. More 
importantly, the analysis of the remittances indicates that the Riksbank notes were used in 
circulation to a higher degree than expected. That would indicate that there was no attempt by 
the business people to withhold Riksbank notes from circulation despite their larger 
possibilities for transactions (including abroad and for taxes). Whether this was forced on the 
merchants by shortages of notes in general or if it was because they did not care what note to 
use is hard to tell. It is probably the former but if not, that does not affect the general 
argument in this paper. 
Relative value 
The content of the remittance represented an amount that was stated on the official form that 
was assured by the postal service and it was this amount that was later acknowledged in the 
business correspondence. Still, the amount was the sum of the valuation of the various notes 
the letter contained.  
It is thus important to make the distinction between the expressed amount and what kinds of 
money that was used in the remittance as payments. It is also important to compare the 
official amount stated in the remittance with the nominal amount of the different kinds of 
money enclosed in the remittance. This provides information whether certain kinds of notes   16
were valued with a premium or a discount in relation to their nominal value (and thus other 
kinds of money). 
As far as it is possible to determine, each note contributed to the total amount of the 
remittance with its nominal value. There are many examples of letters with a wide variety of 
notes with their face value aggregated to a total sum. Actually, there is no indication of any 
discriminatory treatment of any kind of notes in any of all the letters complied. For instance, 
in 1863 Halén sent 1301 rdr rmt 48 öre from Härnösand to Bergström in Umeå. The letter 
contained in total 108 notes and some stamps, all denominated in Riksdaler Riksmynt. There 
were two Riksbank notes, one of 100 Riksdaler and one of 1 Riksdaler, one Filialbank 
assignation of 100 Riksdaler, eight Stockholm Enskilda bank notes of 10 Riksdaler each and 
then a mixture of 5, 10, 50 and 100 Riksdaler notes issued by Mälareprovincernas Enskild 
bank which had a branch office in Härnösand at the time. This is only one example that 
clearly shows that the exact amount was important, not least since the stamps were added to 
achieve the exact amount.
 22 
This example proves that Riksbank notes and Enskilda bank notes circulated side by side in 
payments fixed at par value. It also shows that assignations issued by the Filialbanks and 
drawn on the Riksbank were valued at par with other forms of notes. The Filialbanks were 
private banks without the right to issue notes that operated between 1854 and 1872 and 
funded their business with equity capital and credit from the Riksbank.
23 In addition stamps 
would be used as a kind of token coins to cover for the smallest denominations. In one case, 
we have found an instruction to the postmaster to exchange small silver coins for stamps to be 
included in the letter. 
One Enskilda bank failed in 1878 due to embezzlement with the note issuance. Not even 
this episode led to discounts of the banks notes. Instead the notes were refused as means of 
payments until another bank guaranteed the liabilities of this bank. Immediately after the 
news of its unjust business was out other actors, not least the Riksbank, refused the notes of 
the bank. We do not know, however, how soon the news found merchants and other holders 
of the bank’s notes.
24  
                                                 
22 Postmuseum: II.260.b; Härnösand (1863), Halén to Bergström, Umeå. The amount listed differed from that 
specified on the receipt without any obvious reason in only two instances. Postmuseum, II.260.b.; Härnösand 
(1863), Halén to Cederlund, Stockholm and Trelleborg (1864), Persson to Linderholm, Karlshamn. 
23 See Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking, Chapter 2  
24 The bank was Wadstena Enskilda bank. It was taken over by a local competitor, Östergötlands Enskilda bank. 
B. Segrell, Vadstena enskilda bank: 1857–1887 (Vadstena, 1993).   17
Seasonal distribution 
The notes issued by the Enskilda banks also followed a seasonal pattern. This pattern rhymed 
well with the seasonal demand for liquidity of the agricultural cycle in Sweden.
25 A large 
form of lending, which was how the Enskilda bank would issue their notes, was in the form of 
credit granted or overdrafts. This means that the borrower could utilize the funds (or the 
credit) of the bank when necessary. Such an arrangement served well to smooth the changing 
demand for liquidity by merchants, large-scale farmers and manufacturers. Moreover, the 
Enskilda banks normally did not utilize their legal right to issue notes to the fullest extent why 
they had room for flexible note issuance.
26  
There is nothing in the registered-letter that discloses the reason for sending money. But we 
know from previous studies on the business correspondence of some Swedish iron-masters 
and grain traders in the nineteenth century that remittances seldom were directly related to 
specific transactions of goods or services. They either forwarded money to agents purchasing 
grain directly from farmers or remitted money more or less regular to settle the accounts with 
trading partners. Clear is also that the business men tried to avoid making payments in the 
busy part of the seasons and waited for numerous transactions to level out the claims before 
the balance was eventually settled by a remittance. 
27 We might therefore expect that the 
money sent by registered-letter post was for settling accumulated debts and not directly for 
making payments.  
The seasonal distribution of the remittances analysed fit with the expected pattern. There 
are two peaks a year, in February to April and in October and November (Table 6). Therefore, 
we assume that the data is somewhat representative and that it is possible to make a few 
observations with theoretical implications. The difference between the peak and the trough is 
about 4.5 times. Since the number of remittances only increased by 50 per cent, the size of the 
remittances increases 3 times in the peak months. This indicates the flexibility that the 
demand for money required. 
                                                 
25 Ögren, ‘Free or central banking?’; A. Ögren. ‘The Force of Private Note Issuance: Note Issuing Commercial 
Banks in the Economic and Financial Development of Nineteenth Century Sweden, unpublished paper presented 
at the European Business History Association Conference in Geneva September 13 – 15 and EHFF Economic 
History seminar, Stockholm School of Economics, 27 Feb. (2007) 
26 Ögren, Money, Credit and Banking. 
27 T. Engdahl, ‘Making better money. Merchant demand for regional banking, 1830–1870’, WP, Department of 
Economic History, Uppsala University (forthcoming).   18
































Jan. 35  68013  7%  1973  21%  5%  52% 
Feb. 51  106620  12%  2092  12%  12%  19% 
Mar.  58  129130  14% 2242 9%  17%  12% 
Apr. 59  121555  14%  2069  16%  14%  22% 
May  47  53329 6% 1137 5%  6%  15% 
June 51  47725 5%  942  6%  5%  24% 
July 44  33872  4% 776  2%  3%  13% 
Aug. 40  27585 3%  691 2%  2%  15% 
Sept. 39  56516 6% 1451 2%  7%  7% 
Oct. 65  100550  11%  1549  14% 12%  22% 
Nov. 42  95727  11% 2281 9%  11%  15% 
Dec.  49  55368 6% 1133 3%  6%  10% 
 580  895990  100%  1551 100%  100% 
Source: Postmuseum: II.260.b.; 1830–1872 
In table 6, it is shown that the proportions between the use of Riksbank notes and Enskilda 
bank notes were rather stable between the months with a few the exceptions. The large share 
of Riksbank notes in January is explained by one outlier, while the low share in March might 
be explained by the fact that Riksbank notes were used for tax payments then. 
Circuits and geographical patterns 
It is difficult to find any regional patterns in the material but a few things are clear. 
Remittances sent from Stockholm contained mainly Riksbank notes and only a very limited 
number of Enskilda bank notes. This might further contribute to the interpretation of table 4, 
that the sample shows a high proportion of Enskilda bank notes, since the remaining 
registered letter receipts show a clear bias in favour of middle-sized trading centres. 
This fits with another general observation. It seems as the kind of private notes sent from 
one location depends on which banks that had a branch in that location. In a few cases, where 
the sender has listed the serial numbers of the notes, it is shown that the letter contains up to 
seven consecutive notes from the local bank.
28 This indicates that the local branch supplied 
the remitter with cash in order to allow him to send money to another location. Almost all 
                                                 
28 See for instance Postmuseum: II.260.b; Västerås (1848), Almström to Glosemeyer, Stockholm; Härnösand 
(1859), Halén to Asp, Hjo.    19
major note-issuing banks were located in regional trading centres outside Stockholm and 
Gothenburg. It seems that in these two main cities in Sweden there was an ample supply of 
Riksbank notes. 
There does not seem to be any tendency as to where the money was sent. All kind of private 
notes were sent all over the country which is shown by two receipts from local branches of the 
Kalmar Enskilda Bank. The branches send money to the limited liability commercial bank 
Skandinaviska Kredit Aktiebolaget in Stockholm which had became the centre for a national 
clearing system for Enskilda bank notes. The letters contain about 350 and 150 notes 
respectively from 20 and 13 different banks from Westerbotten and Sundsvall in the north to 
Skånes Enskilda Bank in the South.
29 
Conclusion – Theoretical interpretations 
This section initiates a discussion on the theoretical implications of the Swedish case for our 
understanding of complementary relationships among multiple monies. Sweden re-adopted 
the silver standard both in 1776 and in 1834. Despite this measure, the means of payment in 
circulation did not become homogeneous with respect to origin. On the contrary, the number 
of co-circulating notes expanded shortly after the re-adoption in both cases. However the 
experiences in these two cases differ.  
The Swedish monetary system had different kinds of means of payments with different 
qualities. We would in accordance with Mundell’s version of Gresham’s Law expect either 
that these were treated at different rates, probably with fluctuating values. Or, if they were 
traded at par, we would expect that the notes of high quality, the Riksbank notes, were drawn 
out of circulation. While the findings of the late eighteenth century partly support this 
prediction, the findings of the late nineteenth century do not.  
In the late eighteenth century, only a fraction of the notes redeemable in silver remained in 
circulation and there existed a premium on these notes in the market although for several 
years smaller than expected. In the mid-nineteenth century, although some notes redeemable 
in silver were withdrawn from circulation by the private banks, a substantial amount of notes 
remained in circulation and there is no evidence of a premium on these notes. It seems as the 
key to maintaining the stability in monetary value and the balance between different monies 
                                                 
29 Postmuseum: II.260.b; Borgholm (1874) and Mönsterås (1871): Kalmar Enskild Bank to Skandinaviska Kredit 
Aktiebolaget, Stockholm. These two documents have not been included in the database otherwise used in this 
paper.   20
during these two periods was whether a complementary relationship between varieties of 
paper money in circulation was achieved. 
When we try to understand why not one homogenous national currency appeared in any of 
these two instances, the evidence suggests that the attempt to stabilise the currency by fixing 
the foreign exchange rate of official money through the silver standard limited the supply of 
money for the domestic market at a level below demand. It appears that there was a shortage 
of means of clearing of debts. The Swedish economy was to a large extent based on bilateral 
credit relations maintained by book keeping while all kind of cash payments seems to have 
been kept at a minimum. The problem was how to clear debts with a limited amount of 
official money supply and without a national banking system allowing a more efficient 
clearing.  
We suggest that the cause for coexistence of multiple monies is that without the multiple 
means of settlement in circulation, the money supply would have been too restrictive on 
economic activity. This was especially obvious in the busy months of the year. In the Swedish 
case, the demand for money would culminate in February and March when winter conditions 
allowed for the transport of goods, especially last autumn crops, and in September when most 
annual accounts were cleared before the end of the financial year. No one in the Swedish 
economy, not even the state, had the capacity to create flexible liquidity nearly to the required 
amount necessary to facilitate trade and production decisions. 
The main support for our hypothesis is the fact that the introduction of new money with a 
doubtful legal position, limited official acceptance for instance for tax payments and with 
inferior backing was accepted at par value or close to par value with legal tender; i.e. 
Riksbank notes. As the case with Wadstena Enskild bank shows, if one form of money came 
to be regarded as of larger risk it would not lead to discounts in the domestic market but that 
kind of money would simply disappear since it would not be accepted for transactions any 
longer. 
It seems clear that the quality of the supply did not determine the value of notes. As long as 
the aggregated supply of various origins was below total demand relative prices between these 
various monies tended to be stable. That can be explained by the argument that the utility of 
accepting or treating different monies as equal was higher than the risk of a relative fall in 
value of the monies held. One factor which affected the relative risk of a fall in value is of 
course how long time each individual kept their money. If shortage was a reality, those   21
periods would be short since incoming money was used for immediate clearing of other debts. 
This seems to have been the case in eighteenth and nineteenth century Sweden. 
Since demand was fluctuating, this required that the supply was made flexible as well. The 
monetary sector of the economy must have been flexible enough to respond to the varying 
demand for money without causing instability by over issuing of money. The solution to this 
shortage of money (especially when a war is on its way) is not trivial.  
The different episode in this case is the episode with the National Debt Office notes and 
Riksbank notes. Although the increase of money supply at first was welcome, it tended in the 
long run to be too high and the stability between the relative values of different monies were 
not maintained. This has previously been understood as caused by the over-issuing of parallel 
money. We suggest, however, that it was caused by the lack of flexibility in the money 
supply, especially in the lack of a mechanism for redeeming money during seasonal slacks in 
demand. Still, it is not impossible that the system of complementary monies could have 
sustained given the existence of a market to price these two currencies and the fact that both 
currencies could be used for tax payments. These two features might together have been an 
effective mechanism for restraining over issuance of a currency in the long run. This we will 
never know since politicians decided to fix the relative value of the two monies and put 
thereby effectively a stop to the evaluation by the market. 
The question is why the attempt to fix the value of the currency turned out to be sustainable 
in the nineteenth century. There seem to be many conditions that are not in favour of the 
successful adoption of a metal standard at this time. The Swedish monetary authorities did not 
hold much metal as reserves, the economy experience a substantial balance of payment deficit 
for more than sixty years, the seasonal fluctuations in the economy remained significant and, 
in addition, the economy went through a thorough transformation from a basically agrarian 
and proto-industrial economy to one with a industrial sector contributing substantial to the 
national income. Hence, there are no reasons to believe that structural changes caused the 
sudden monetary stability but instead that it was due to innovations within the monetary 
system. 
We suggest that the explanation lies in the expansion of the multiple monetary system that 
emerged in the nineteenth century. Due to this system, demand could really steer supply since 
banks would have to redeem notes that they over issued. The banks also had the possibility to 
alter their portfolios to follow demand. When the early private banks started their activities in 
the 1830s and 1840s, they organised a clearing system as a remedy for one of the causes of   22
illiquidity. With a debt creating system (private or banks) the number of accounts increases 
and the mechanisms to transfer “funds” between these accounts increase. Initially, it seems as 
these credit accounts mainly were a reorganisation of the clearing mechanism by a 
concentration of accounts in one place. This concentration allowed for multiple clearing 
between large numbers of traders. The banks accounts thereby help to synchronise the flows 
of incomes and the need for clearing debts. Furthermore, it put the clearing of accounts in the 
hands of a third part, at least nominally. 
Still, the clearing systems was not ‘integrated’ enough to ensure that money was allocated 
to the ‘right place’. Individual persons (due to his personal position) could not access money 
of any other kind than that created either by himself or after 1850 by the bank at his locality. 
The endogenous process of money creation and the clearing mechanism for money 
destruction are two significant parts of the Swedish monetary system. Hence endogenous 
credit allowed for a more flexible money supply by the creation of liquid credit both at the 
right place and the right time. 
The conclusion is that we find the complementary relationships among monies in the multiple 
sources of endogenous money that supply the economy with the means of settlements needed 
to balance all the various transactions systems in which an economy is involved. 
Complementary monies are a response to the markets need for flexibility of liquidity in time 
and in space. The supply of paper monies is always there – the supply will increase if demand 
increases – but is stopped if the increase leads to devaluation. The question is how the supply 
is organized to better adjust to a volatile demand of money, a demand that varies with the 
demand for money for seasonal, regional, domestic and international transactions. 
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